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United Charities and the Sherman Act
The old United Way slogan "Give once and give for all" expresses the
fundamental appeal of the united charity system.' To an American public
besieged by requests for donations, the united charity approach offers a
measure of relief and the legitimate response "I gave at the office." For
businesses, a federated charity campaign reduces the workplace disruption
that occurs when a steady stream of charities solicits donations from em-
ployees. And for member organizations, united charities constitute an eco-
nomical fundraising system that assures them the respectability that stems
from the monitoring procedures followed by most united charities.
To charities that are unable to join a united charity, however, these
federations are a threat. Employers that allow united charities to solicit in
the workplace frequently exclude unaffiliated charities.' Employees who
give at the office are understandably less generous when approached for
the second or third (or thirtieth) time. In response, various groups have
challenged several aspects of the united charity system.'
Some of the challenged practices restrain competition among producers
of charitable services, thus raising a variety of antitrust issues. This Note
explores the possible application of the Sherman Act to the conduct of
united charities. The Note begins by examining the structure of the united
charity system.4 It then describes the market for charitable services and
1. In this Note the term "united charity" refers to an organization that conducts joint fundraising
on behalf of independent charities. The best known example of a united charity is the United Way of
America, a federation of over 2000 local chapters that raises and distributes more than one billion
dollars a year. See Cook, Is Charity Obsolete?, FORBES, Feb. 5, 1979, at 45.
2. Local chapters of the United Way of America enjoy exclusive access to almost 90% of the
workplaces in which they solicit. See Wexler, Corporate Charity, NEW REPUBLIC, April 5, 1980, at
21.
3. See, e.g., National Black United Fund, Inc. v. Devine, 667 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejec-
tion of application to participate in combined federal campaign); Moye v. Chrysler Corp., 465
F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (employer's refusal to grant charity access to payroll deduction);
International Serv. Agencies v. United Way, 108 Misc. 2d 305, 437 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. 1981)
(restrictions on participation in solicitation of state employees); Associated In-Group Donors
v. United Way, Inc., No. C-233,112 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 13, 1978) (refusal to allow charities
to participate in separate joint campaigns).
4. The author's research in this section was aided greatly by discussions with Professor Rose-
Ackerman, whose article United Charities: An Economic Analysis, 28 PUB. POL'Y 323 (1980), led this
author to many of his sources.
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analyzes that market's inherent failures and the role that the Sherman Act
should play in promoting the optimal provision of charitable services. The
Note next considers the Sherman Act implications of several practices in
which united charities have allegedly engaged; it concludes that although
the Sherman Act does not preclude the formation of a united charity, it
does prohibit such a charity from engaging in certain anticompetitive
practices.
I. The United Charity Controversy
United charities exist to conduct joint fundraising on behalf of their
members.' Most such fundraising is done by means of the weekly payroll
deduction system.' Under that system, the united charity asks a company's
employees to pledge a "fair share" of their weekly salary, which the em-
ployer automatically deducts from their weekly paycheck and gives to the
united charity. The united charity distributes this money to its members
in proportions determined by its allocations committee.
The payroll deduction system is an extremely efficient fundraising de-
vice. Because solicitations in the workplace tend to be disruptive,7 how-
ever, employers generally prefer to limit the number of charities they per-
mit to solicit. The tension between the cost efficiency of payroll deductions
and the disruption caused by workplace solicitation provided the original
impetus for the creation of the single-fund drives that have evolved into
united charities.8
In many cases, membership in a united charity is the only way to gain
access to the payroll deduction system. As a result, some charities denied
membership in a united charity are unable to survive. But many united
charities only admit organizations that have proven their viability as inde-
pendent charities for several years,9 thereby making it difficult for new
5. Most united charities focus their fundraising efforts on an annual solicitation drive. During
that campaign, the united charity distributes materials to employees and sends representatives, usually
volunteers, into workplaces to explain the united charity system. Employees that volunteer to help
conduct the campaign usually do the actual solicitation of contributions. At the end of a campaign, the
united charity typically gives awards to successful volunteers and to firms whose employees have a
high rate of participation. See C. BAKAL, CHARITY U.S.A. 409-11 (1979).
6. The payroll deduction method of fundraising accounted for over 60% of United Way of
America funds in 1979. See Wexler, supra note 2, at 20.
7. Shortly after World War II, the Ford Motor Co. computed that the average charity drive cost
it $40,000 in lost production. See Chernow, Cornering the Goodness Market: Uncharitable Doings at
United Way, SATURDAY REV., Oct. 28, 1978, at 15, 16.
8. The payroll deduction system developed during World War II, when federal war-bond drives
plagued American factories. The cost efficiency of the system quickly became dear, but businessmen
objected to the disruption caused by a steady stream of fundraisers in the workplace. After the war,
businessmen nationwide seized on the idea of a single-fund drive that would encompass all charitable
donations. As united charities gradually evolved, many businesses granted them exclusive rights to
solicit their employees. See id.
9. The United Way of Greater New Haven, for example, requires that an organization be at least
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charities to gain support. Others admit only agencies that operate on a
national scale, thus excluding small charities that focus their efforts lo-
cally.10 In addition, many united charities openly acknowledge that mem-
bership in their organization is contingent upon the applicant's ability to
appeal to shared values of the local community."1 This standard excludes
many charities that address controversial issues such as desegregation,
birth control, and worker safety.12
The exclusion of controversial organizations is in part a natural result
of the common united charity practice of effectively preventing donors
from allocating their gifts to a particular member charity." If a donor
objects to a single charity within the package of charities represented by
the united charity, he may decide to withhold his gift entirely. The risk of
alienating potential donors gives united charities an economic incentive to
deny membership to controversial agencies.'
4
The exclusivity of united charities has produced demands that their ac-
tivities be constrained."5 Groups seeking membership in a united charity
or direct access to the workplace have filed suits against united charities.'
6
three years old before it can apply for membership. See United Way of Greater New Haven, Manual
of Policies and Procedures for United Way/Agency Relations (1979) (admissions section).
10. See, e.g., National Black United Fund, Inc. v. Campbell, 494 F. Supp. 748 (D.D.C. 1980)
(finding national scope requirement for participation in federal charity drive overly broad and in
violation of First Amendment ), rev'd sub noma. National Black United Fund, Inc. v. Devine, 667
F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1981). A similar issue was raised by attempts of the Reagan Administration to
restrict participation in the Combined Federal Campaign, which solicits federal employees. See Wash.
Post, May 11, 1982, at A20, col. 1.
11. The head of the United Way of America, William Aramony, is quoted as saying: "By its very
nature, the United Way cannot have extremes of left or right. It's a consensus system. And to that
degree, you won't get a radical avant-garde position." Chernow, supra note 7, at 18.
12. For example, until 1977 Planned Parenthood of Northwest Indiana received funding from its
local United Way. In that year, its funding-which had risen to $64,000 per year-was summarily
terminated when Planned Parenthood announced plans to open an abortion clinic, even though the
clinic was to be fully supported by patient fees. See id. at 16. In North Carolina and South Carolina,
the Brown Lung Association recently picketed textile companies in which the United Way solicits
exclusively; the Association objected to the refusal of 10 United Way chapters to fund the Associa-
tion's local chapters. The Association claimed funds were denied because many representatives of the
textile industry, a longtime opponent of the Association, serve on local United Way boards. National
Commmittee for Responsive Philanthropy, Responsive Philanthropy 2 (Winter 1980) (newsletter).
13. See infra p. 1607 (describing allocations process).
14. In recent years, almost half of the United Way's support has gone to eight groups: the Red
Cross, the Salvation Army, the Family Service Agency, settlement houses, the YMCA, the YWCA,
Boys' Clubs, and the Boy Scouts. Cook, supra note 1, at 45. This clustering is remarkable considering
that the funds are allocated by 2200 separate campaigns. Chernow, supra note 7, at 16.
15. The tension that united charities create is heightened by the financial difficulties currently
facing many charities. The number of charities has increased dramatically in recent years, but the
volume of donations has only kept pace with inflation. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 18,
1981, at 18. Thus, competition among charities has become increasingly fierce. As a result, the yield
from many forms of fundraising has dropped dramatically, see Cook, supra note 1, at 48-51 (competi-
tion among charities increasing), causing the fundraising costs of most charities to increase
significantly.
16. See National Black United Fund, Inc. v. Devine, 667 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United
Black Fund, Inc. v. Hampton, 352 F. Supp. 898 (D.D.C. 1972).
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Donors have also sought legal redress for their inability to give to the
charity of their choice through the payroll deduction system.17 These suits
have been based on a wide variety of legal grounds." In very few in-
stances, however, have the parties recognized the potential of the Sherman
Act 9 as a basis for their suits.20
The central purpose of the Sherman Act is to promote consumer wel-
fare,2" which is desirable in the charity and nonprofit sectors as well as in
the for-profit sector. Nothing in the language of the Act prevents its appli-
cation to the nonprofit or charity sectors. 2 Moreover, implicit exemptions
17. See Moye v. Chrysler Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
18. Many of the suits have been brought on constitutional grounds. See City of Charlotte v. Local
660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976) (refusal to grant payroll deductions for union
dues when allowed for United Way does not violate equal protection); National Black United Fund,
Inc. v. Campbell, 494 F. Supp. 748 (D.D.C. 1980) (combined Federal Campaign regulations violate
First and Fifth Amendments), rev'd sub nom. National Black United Fund, Inc. v. Devine, 667 F.2d
173 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Moye v. Chrysler Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (refusal to
allow United Black Community Fund to solicit in workplace where United Way solicits does not
violate either Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
20. A few suits have been brought under state antitrust statutes. International Serv. Agencies
v. United Way, 108 Misc. 2d 305, 437 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Associated In-Group Donors
v. United Way, No. C-233,112 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 13, 1978); California State Combined
Health Agencies Drive, Inc. v. United Way, No. 382,156 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 16, 1977).
21. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50-89 (1978). Although most commentators would
agree that consumer welfare is a central concern of the Act, some commentators suggest that the Act
should, or does, reflect other goals as well. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
§ 2 (1977) (other purposes include "a preference for decentralization of economic power, ... [and] a
nostalgia for that mythical past when social, governmental and economic organization was simpler,
more comprehensible"); Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency,
What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1194-202 (1977) (listing goals as redistribution of
income, promotion of small enterprises, and liberty of entrepreneurs). Compare Blake & Jones, In
Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 382-84 (1965) (listing goals as minimization of politi-
cal interference and enlargement of individual liberty) and Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimen-
sional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM1. L. REV. 422, 425-36 (1965) (same) with Bork, Contrasts in Anti-
trust Theory: 1, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 412-15 (1965) (limiting goals to maximization of efficiency)
and Bork & Bowman, Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965) (same).
22. The Sherman Act regulates commerce that affects "trade or commerce among the several
States." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). In determining whether a particular practice is "commercial,"
courts have consistently denied a blanket antitrust immunity for nonprofits based on charitable pur-
pose or organizational form. See infra note 24. Instead, courts have examined the nature of the partic-
ular practice under challenge. Under this approach, courts have held that legal services, for example,
fall within the statutory definition of commerce. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)
(legal profession not immune from Sherman Act). When nonprofit organizations negotiate contracts
and make profit-motivated decisions, courts consider the practice commercial. Hennessey v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976), reprinted in 564 F.2d
1141 (millions of dollars obtained by negotiating television contracts and selling tickets evidence that
some aspects of National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n were commercial), afl'd per curiam, 564 F.2d 1136
(5th Cir. 1977).
Charitable solicitation has many commercial features. Competing charities campaign aggressively to
sell their charitable services to the public. In setting up united charities, participating members fre-
quently bargain among themselves to determine the relative size of each other's allocations. These
bargains reflect revenue-maximizing negotiations. See Cook, supra note 1, at 46 (United Way chap-
ters in Dallas, Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Cleveland have special arrangements with Heart Ass'n




from the Sherman Act are strongly disfavored."3 Indeed, courts have al-
ready held some nonprofit activities subject to the Sherman Act.24
But in using the Sherman Act to regulate the charity sector, rules of
structure and conduct developed in the for-profit sector may not be appro-
priate.25 Various institutional factors differ between the two sectors, as do
many cost and demand conditions. To appreciate such differences requires
an understanding of the economics of the charity sector.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-53 (1963) (federal
regulation of banking does not exempt banks from antitrust laws); Silver v. New York Stock Ex-
change, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (authority to regulate securities does not exempt stock exchange rules
from antitrust). In the absence of a statutory exemption, courts have found the antitrust laws inappli-
cable only when they conflicted with other policies of profound national importance. See, e.g., United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965) (recognizing implicit exemption for at-
tempts to solicit government action); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-45 (1961) (same); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943) (establish-
ing implicit exemption from antitrust laws, rooted in principles of federalism, for actions by states).
The stringency of courts regarding exemptions reflects the perception that if Congress wants certain
activities to enjoy antitrust immunity, it can so provide. Congress has, for example, explicitly ex-
empted "charitable institutions not operated for profit" from the prohibition on price discrimination
contained in the Robinson-Patman Amendments to the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976).
24. For examples involving amateur athletics, see Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n exclusive television contract with national network subject to challenge); Hennessey v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976), reprinted in 564 F.2d
1141 (National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n by-law limiting number of coaches certain schools could hire
subject to challenge), alT'd per curiam, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Tondas v. Amateur Hockey
Ass'n of United States, 438 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (amateur hockey subject to antitrust
laws). For examples involving the learned professions, see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982) (striking down society's maximum-fee schedule as illegal per se); Na-
tional Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (striking down association
by-law limiting competitive bidding); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (striking
down minimum fee schedule put out by state bar); Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d
626 (9th Cir.) (requirement of membership in national association not immune), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 825 (1977). Educational institutions have been found exempt in the past, see Marjorie Webster
Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970), but the rationale expressed in Goldfarb\ would seem to
preclude such holdings in the future.
25. In the for-profit sector, restraints of trade are analyzed using two standards: the rule of reason
and the per se doctrine. The rule of reason applies to restraints of trade that may be justifiable under
some conditions because their net effect is to enhance competition and thereby improve allocative
efficiency. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-66 (1911). The per se doctrine applies to practices that have no
beneficial effect upon competition and that are therefore illegal in all cases. See, e.g., United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218-22 (1940) (price fixing); United States v. Trenton
Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927) (same).
Courts have recognized that the existence of noncommercial objectives in certain areas of commerce
may require that a practice be treated differently than it would be in traditional for-profit activities.
See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686-96 (1978); Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89 n.17 (1975) ("[lit would be unrealistic to view the
practice of professions as interchangeable with other activities, and automatically to apply to the pro-
fessions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas."); Hennessey v. National Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976), reprinted in 564 F.2d 1141 (analyz-
ing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n by-law with "marked similarity to an agreement for allocation
of 'market shares'" under rule of reason even though it would be illegal per se in for-profit sector),
afl'd per curiam, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
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II. The Economics of the Charity Sector
To obtain Pareto optimality"6 in a market composed of for-profit firms,
certain conditions must be met. When these conditions are not met, alter-
native institutions may replace the for-profit market."' The nonprofit firm
is one institution that has emerged in sectors where transactions between
buyers and for-profit sellers do not lead to Pareto optimality.28 The char-
ity sector is a sector in which the nonprofit firm has flourished.29
A. The Demand for Charitable Services
The demand side of the charity market consists of donors willing to pay
26. Pareto optimality provides a definition of allocative efficiency. An allocation of resources is
Pareto optimal if production and distribution cannot be altered to increase the utility of any individual
without decreasing the utility of others. J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY
255 (1958).
Allocative efficiency depends on three conditions: efficiency in production, efficiency in distribution,
and consumer sovereignty. For a detailed explanation of these concepts, see Scherer, General Equilib-
rium and Economic Efficiency, 10 AM. ECONOMIST 1 (1966).
27. Government-operated firms, such as Amtrak, and government regulation are two common
responses to failures of for-profit markets.
28. Nonprofit firms often supplant their for-profit counterparts when a purchaser cannot evaluate
the service that is purchased. This may happen for two reasons. First, the recipient of the good may
not be the same person as the purchaser. See, e.g., Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89
YALE L.J. 835, 846 (1980) (illustrating this problem using example of services provided overseas by
CARE); Nelson & Krashinsky, Public Contract and Economic Organization of Day Care for Young
Children, 22 PUB. POL'Y 53, 66-69 (1974) (explaining preeminence of nonprofit firms in day-care
business as result of inability of parents to evaluate quality of services provided). Second, the good
being purchased may be a public good. Public goods cost no more to provide for many people than for
a single person, and their benefits cannot be reserved to the individuals who pay for their production.
National defense and clean air are typical examples. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49-80 (2d ed. 1976) (describing and discussing public goods);
Hansmann, supra, at 848-51 (discussing problem of public goods using commercial-free broadcasting
as example).
Under either of these circumstances, an individual who contracts with a for-profit firm finds it
difficult to enforce the terms of his agreement. When the purchaser is not also the recipient, the
purchaser may not be able to tell what quality of service was provided or even whether the service
was provided at all. A for-profit firm would have an incentive to economize on the service provided
and to take advantage of the donor's inability to enforce his agreement. Hansmann, supra, at 835;
Nelson & Krashinsky, supra, at 66-69. In the case of public goods, the difficulty of evaluating services
results from the indivisible nature of the service. The consumer cannot tell whether his contribution
improved the service or increased the profits of the producers. For-profit firms would have an incen-
tive to request contributions far in excess of the amount required to pay for the service. Hansmann,
supra, at 848-51.
A nonprofit organization is, by definition, barred from distributing its net earnings to individuals
who exercise control over it. This legal constraint reduces the incentive for a firm to exploit the
purchaser's inability to police his bargain by providing low quality services. The nondistribution con-
straint also assures donors that their contribution will increase the output of the service they wish to
support. Id. at 843-54.
29. For purposes of this Note, "charities" are a subset of the more inclusive "nonprofits." Chari-
ties are organizations that receive most of their income from grants or donations and that have as their
purpose the promotion of social welfare. "Nonprofits" include a much wider assortment of organiza-
tions, ranging from country clubs to labor unions. See Hansmann, supra note 28, at 840-43 (con-
structing four-class categorization of nonprofits, two of which are described as "donative nonprofits,"
which this Note refers to as charities).
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for the production of charitable services. Although contributions to chari-
ties may appear to be unilateral transfers, they are actually payments in
return for which the donor receives something of value. The donor may
gain satisfaction from helping a particular group of beneficiaries, or he
may feel a more generalized sense of status, community, or relief from
guilt.3 ° An individual's gift to a charity represents an allocation of his
wealth to the services provided by the charity, and away from other goods
and services. The quantity and variety of charitable services that an indi-
vidual purchases with charitable donations depends on the marginal satis-
faction he would gain by purchasing other goods. Because charitable do-
nations are consumption purchases, each individual can be expected to
donate to a given charity up to the level at which the utility he receives
from the last dollar he donates is equal to the utility he would have re-
ceived from either donating that dollar to another charity or spending it
on some other good."
Because the utility derived by an individual who makes a charitable
donation is partially attributable to a generalized sense of altruism, 32 com-
petition in a charity market extends beyond the set of firms that provides
a particular charitable service. The degree of substitutability between dif-
ferent charitable services is an empirical issue that must be resolved on a
case-by-case basis when a market must be defined. 3 In the abstract, how-
30. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that donors give to charities up to the level that
maximizes their utility, although such a statement is so formal as to border on tautology. More help-
ful information would be the composition of the utility functions of individual donors. See generally
T. IRELAND & D. JOHNSON, THE ECONOMICS OF CHARITY 19-22 (1970) (suggesting five different
motivations underlying donations: direct personal benefits, satisfaction from seeing others benefitted,
enjoyment from act of giving, desire for political approval, and compliance with condition of employ-
ment); Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 18 (E. Phelps
ed. 1975) (reviewing different theories concerning the rationality of altruism); Boulding, Notes on a
Theory of Philanthropy, in PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC POLICY 57 (F. Dickinson ed. 1962); Schall,
Interdependent Utilities and Pareto Optimality, 86 Q.J. ECON. 19 (1972) (discussing utility functions
in which utility of person A is in part function of utility of person B); Schwartz, Personal Philan-
thropic Contributions, 78 J. POL. ECON. 1264 (1970) (same); Scott, Avarice, Altruism, and Second
Party Preferences, 86 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1972) (same).
31. See R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS 140-42 (1978) (individual's allocation of wealth
depends on relative marginal utilities of different uses); Scott, supra note 30, at 1-6 (discussing utility
function of altruistic individuals); S. Rose-Ackerman, Charitable Giving and "Excessive" Fundraising
4 (Yale University, Institution for Social & Policy Studies, Program for Non-Profit Organizations,
working paper no. 26, 1980) (giving depends on relative marginal utilities of different uses).
32. See T. IRELAND & D. JOHNSON, supra note 30 (describing motivations for giving); Schall,
supra note 30 (discussing interdependent utility functions); Schwartz, supra note 30, at 1264-68,
1289-91 (same).
33. Market definition is a central aspect of many antitrust cases because it forms the basis for an
analysis of whether market power exists. The ideal definition of a market must take into account the
substitution possibilities for both demand and supply (that is, cross-elasticity). For a discussion of
cross-elasticity of demand, see United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393-
95 (1956) (applying cross-elasticity concept of market definition); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 221-23 (2d ed. 1977) (explaining severe practical limitations on application of cross-elasticity
concept); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 60-61
(1980) (discussing theoretical concepts in market definition and practical difficulties of actually defin-
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ever, one might expect many donors to feel a high level of substitutability
between hunger-relief charities; for other donors, health-related charities
may be highly substitutable; for others, charities that promote some inter-
est of a particular ethnic or religious group would be substitutable. The
amount of aggregate substitutability among charitable services depends to
a large extent on the cross-cutting interests of a community of donors.
These preferences can be determined only through observation of a given
set of donors.
B. The Supply of Charitable Services
The supply side of the charity market consists of the nonprofit organi-
zations that produce charitable services. Although the inability of charities
to distribute profits removes one incentive for the supply of charitable ser-
vices, a variety of factors may motivate entrepreneurs and managers to
enter the charity sector. 4 Some may derive satisfaction from the fact that
a firm produces services without regard for the profit the services yield.
Others may derive satisfaction from providing certain services that only
charities provide35 or from influencing the provision of such services. Still
others, who have no capital to invest and who need employment, may
enter the charity sector for purely monetary gain.
In the absence of competition, it is likely that the services offered by
charities will differ significantly from those that donors desire for the fol-
lowing reasons: first, the managers of a charity may derive satisfaction
directly from the provision of specific services that differ from the services
desired by donors;3" second, entry into the charity sector may not be fast
enough to respond fully to donors' desires; and third, information about
services provided by other charities may not be sufficient for donors to
transfer their patronage among firms.
Of course, the managers of a charity cannot wholly neglect the desires
ing markets). For a discussion of cross-elasticity of supply, see id. at 60-61.
34. See Hansmann, supra note 28, at 876, 899-901; B. Weisbrod, Economics of Institutional
Choice, (Conference on Institutional Choice and the Private Nonprofit Sector, University of Wiscon-
sin, Madison, Oct. 1979) (differences between supply of nonprofit and for-profit goods and services).
In order to distinguish among the qualities of entrepreneurship that are found in different segments of
the economy, Hansmann and Weisbrod postulate a "screening process" that filters entrepreneurial
individuals into different sectors according to their own personalities and the structural characteristics
of the different sectors. Young carries the analysis a step further by examining different sectors at the
industry level according to four properties: the character of the services produced, the degree of control
by the professions, the degree of economic concentration, and the social priority attached to the field.
D. Young, Entrepreneurship and the Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations: Elements of a Theory
(Yale University, Institution for Social & Policy Studies, Program for Non-Profit Organizations,
working paper no. 4, 1980).
35. For example, someone interested in easing the problem of world hunger might enter the non-
profit sector because that sector does most of the work in that field.
36. In the for-profit sector, the profit motive causes firms to respond quickly to consumer desires.
See Scherer, supra note 26 (discussing consumer sovereignty).
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of their benefactors; they must please the benefactors enough to attract
sufficient donations to keep the firm in operation. As a result, an implicit
bargain emerges between the managers of a charity and the donors con-
cerning the services to be provided.17 The more alternative charitable ser-
vices available to donors, the less divergence there will be between the
services donors desire and those provided. An efficient charity sector will
produce precisely the charitable services that the donor population wishes,
and as much of them as donations can cover.
For a variety of reasons, therefore, competitive conditions will benefit
donors even though charities are not profit-making institutions. First,
competition will cause charities to minimize their costs for the services
they provide,3" because donors can be expected to give to the charities that
use donations most efficiently. 9 Free entry into the charity market
strengthens the incentive for firms to minimize their costs. Second, firms
facing competition will tend to produce at the level of output for which
average cost per unit is at its minimum, which is also the level at which
average cost and marginal cost are equal.40 When existing firms operate
above this level, even if they produce efficiently, new charities will tend to
enter the market and offer donors more services per dollar of donation.
These two benefits of competition together enable donors to maximize the
quantity of desired charitable services provided by their donations.
III. The Application of the Sherman Act to United Charities
The beneficial results of competition in the charity sector make it so-
cially desirable to have many charities in competition with each other. At
the same time, however, certain aspects of producing charitable services,
37. A charity that provides a service for which donors have no close substitutes occupies a position
analogous to that of a monopolist in the for-profit sector. In the same way that a for-profit monopolist
has leeway to raise its price to increase profits, the monopolist charity can vary the nature of its
service to increase the particular utilities of those who control the firm.
38. This type of efficiency is sometimes referred to as "x-efficiency." For a fuller explanation of
this term, see Liebenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency," 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966);
see also F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 464-65 (discussing x-inefficiencies).
39. This condition depends upon the donors having some information about the charitable service
they support. It does not, however, depend upon their having perfect or near-perfect information. The
inadequacy of such information provides one explanation for the dominance of nonprofit firms over
for-profit firms in many markets. See supra p. 1598.
Most donative charities cooperate with one of three watchdog agencies that do provide information
to donors: the National Information Bureau, in New York; the Evangelical Association for Financial
Accountability, in Chicago; and the Philanthropic Advisory Service, in Washington, D.C. These agen-
cies provide such information as the percentage of funds absorbed in fundraising, the percentage of
total funds spent on the programs for which the funds were raised, and the percentage of total funds
retained as unexpended income. See Cook, supra note 1, at 50. This information, however, is not
circulated very widely.
40. For a fuller discussion of the importance of market entry for achieving allocative efficiency in
a charity market, see Appendix.
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such as fundraising, are characterized by significant and socially desirable
economies of scale. For that reason certain forms of cooperation among
charities are justifiable under a rule of reason analysis. The Sherman Act
permits cooperation among competitors only if the benefits that result out-
weigh the inefficiencies that reduced competition creates. 41 The proper ap-
plication of the Sherman Act to charities depends on distinguishing be-
tween practices that produce economies of scale or other benefits and
practices that restrain competition without providing greater compensating
social benefit.
A. The Efficiencies of a United Charity
The principal efficiencies created by united charities lie in two general
areas. First, united charities greatly reduce the costs of solicitation. It costs
much less, for example, to have one person collect money for many chari-
ties than to have each charity send a separate representative to solicit each
potential donor.42 In addition, united charities reduce the harassment of
donors that would result if all individual charities conducted independent
campaigns. Moreover, because united charities reduce the workplace dis-
ruption caused by charity drives, they make employers more willing to
sponsor the payroll deduction system.
Second, the existence of united charities lessens the problem of imper-
fect information among donors.' 3 Poor information lowers the utility that
a donor derives from making a charitable contribution and deters dona-
41. See supra note 21 (describing economic efficiency as major goal of Sherman Act); note 25
(explaining rule of reason). The courts have been inconsistent in setting the precise standard for
legality under the rule of reason. In some situations, the courts have held that "[rlestraints of trade
can be justified only in the absence of less restrictive alternatives." Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448
F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); see also Copper Liquor, Inc.
v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Any justification [for restraints of
trade] should be premised on the absence of less restrictive alternatives."). Other courts have applied
the less rigorous test of whether the restraint exceeds "the limits reasonably necessary to meet the
competitive problems." United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380-81 (1966); Amer-
ican Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975) (quoting Schwinn).
42. Likewise, the cost of some forms of advertising, such as television, is the same regardless of
whether a small or a large organization is advertising. The existence of economies of scale can be
inferred from the overhead costs of small and large charities. The American Cancer Society, for exam-
ple, has an income of roughly $130 million and an overhead of 13%. The Epilepsy Foundation, by
contrast, spends 40% of its $7.8 million on fundraising. The overhead of the local chapters of the
United Way of America is typically about 10%. See Cook, supra note 1, at 48-51.
The imperfect information of donors is another source of economies of scale. Because donors are in
a poor position to evaluate services, see supra note 28, they are likely to prefer to deal with agencies
that have name-recognition and a national reputation. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 328 (sug-
gesting that united charities have less to offer to established charities such as Red Cross than to less
well-known organizations).
43. Although single charities do advertise their services and the news media do report egregious
scandals involving charities, donors typically lack complete information about the availability and
quality of services provided by charities. People who would perhaps donate to charity if they had
sufficient information may not be willing to invest heavily in acquiring that information.
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tions that would otherwise be made. Because a donor cannot be sure of
what a contribution will produce, he must discount the value of what he
thinks his gift will accomplish by the probability that he will be wrong.
United charities reduce this uncertainty with their formal allocation
and monitoring procedures. These procedures assure donors that their
gifts will go to a charity that has been approved by an allocations commit-
tee and that the use of their funds will be overseen. For uninformed do-
nors, these procedures can enhance the utility of making a gift by reducing
the need for donors to evaluate services themselves.44
United charities also benefit some donors by assembling packages of
services related to one another by an articulated or unarticulated theme.
For example, some united charities, such as the Combined Health Agency
Drive, consist of only health agencies. The members of others, such as the
National Black United Fund, are linked by a racial theme. Still others,
such as the United Jewish Appeal, have a religious orientation. To the
extent that donors find the services provided by members of such united
charities equally valuable, competition among the members for donations
is socially unproductive: it merely increases the overhead of all members,
thereby reducing the value of their services to donors.45 This packaging
benefits donors by permitting them to delegate the task of allocating their
funds.
B. The Inefficiencies of United Charity Practices
The regulations and policies of united charities suppress competition in
many ways. Some of those restrictions are analogous to restraints that the
Sherman Act prohibits in the for-profit sector. Their legality in the non-
profit sector depends on whether they are needed to create the efficiencies
discussed above.
1. Membership Restrictions
Because of the competitive benefits of membership in a united charity,
restrictions on admission naturally create Sherman Act concerns. Some
restrictions, however, may be socially beneficial. First, a restrictive admis-
sions process enables a united charity to ensure the quality of its member-
ship. That practice benefits donors by assuring them that their gift will go
to an agency that, in the judgment of the admissions committee, will re-
spond to a community need. Second, by controlling membership, the man-
agers of united charities can construct packages of charitable services they
44. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 325-26.
45. See infra pp. 1606-07.
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believe will be particularly attractive to potential donors. 6
But the managers of a united charity can also use the admissions pro-
cess to advance their own interests at the expense of donors and other
charities. By limiting competitors' access to payroll deduction plans, a
united charity can increase competitors' fundraising costs significantly and
thereby reduce competitors' attractiveness to donors.
Under the Sherman Act, a group that has monopoly power because of
control of a particular resource cannot lawfully use that resource to disad-
vantage competitors arbitrarily or invidiously.47 The greater the competi-
tive advantage of access to the resource, and the greater the market share
affected, the more important that the resource be provided to competitors
on a reasonable basis.
The cost advantage of united charity fundraising depends upon the rel-
ative efficiency of other forms of fundraising.4 8 The significance of that
cost advantage must be considered in light of the united charity's share of
all fundraising in the relevant market. For the purposes of determining
market share in this context, the market should be defined geographically
and by type of service. If a united charity represents only a small portion
of the relevant market, the significance of its cost advantage will be mini-
mal; most charities competing for solicitations will still be on an equal
competitive footing.
If a united charity excludes new members because their services are
inconsistent with its theme, a court must examine whether the united
charity has advertised itself to be of a certain nature.49 Allowing charities
to package themselves benefits donors by enabling them to support a
known package of charitable services. Under the Sherman Act, therefore,
a charity is excludable on this basis only if a typical donor would not
consider it properly part of the package advertised by the united charity.
It is more difficult to determine an appropriate test when a united char-
ity excludes an agency because of the doubtful quality of its services. Eval-
46. Depending on donor preferences, it may be more efficient to link a child health agency with
other health agencies rather than with other child welfare agencies. The efficient groupings depend, of
course, on the utility functions of potential donors.
47. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912);
Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 817 (1952). Professor Sullivan summarizes these cases as follows:
We can generalize by saying that if a group of competitors, acting in concert, operate a com-
mon facility and if due to natural advantage, custom, or restrictions of scale, it is not feasible
for excluded competitors to duplicate the facility, the competitors who operate the facility must
give access to the excluded competitors on reasonable, non-discriminatory terms.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 131.
48. For a discussion of the difficulties of fundraising methods other than payroll deductions, see
Cook, supra note 1, at 48-51.
49. In many cases, the theme will be defined by the name of the united charity.
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uation of charitable services is extremely subjective. Still, substantive re-
view on a limited basis is desirable to require a united charity to justify
the particular exclusion."0 In addition, courts should review the admis-
sions process to determine whether it has an inherently invidious bias.
Existing members of a united charity are likely to oppose the admission of
any agency if the new member might cause their own revenues to de-
cline. 51  Such opposition may be for legitimate reasons, such as the
agency's poor management, but it may also be motivated by a desire to
suppress competition for limited funds. Courts should, therefore, approve
an admissions procedure only if decisions are made by an economically
disinterested board.5"
2. Restrictions on Supplemental Fundraising
Many united charities require each member to agree to restrict its own
solicitation activities in exchange for a share of the funds raised by the
group.5" Such agreements, in effect, constitute horizontal market divisions
of the sort that are illegal per se in the for-profit sector under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.54
But restrictions on supplemental fundraising may be necessary to obtain
some benefits of united charity fundraising. Without such restrictions,
united charity members would have an incentive to conduct independent
50. See, e.g., Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.)
(rejecting defendant's substantive justifications for excluding plaintiff from monopolized asset), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952). This type of review can be analogized to judicial review of administra-
tive actions. Some courts in this role have closely examined the substantive determinations on which
agency action was based. See Greater Boston TV Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(reviewing agency determination in detail), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
51. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 327-28.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). That case held illegal an
Associated Press by-law that gave existing members the power to veto the membership applications of
competitors. The court did not force the Associated Press to open access completely, but it held that
the criteria for admission could not include a consideration of whether the applicant was in competi-
tion with existing members. Id. at 20.
53. The restrictions of the United Way of New Haven appear typical. Supplemental fundraising
is to be conducted so that it does not conflict with the United Way campaign. Such fundraising must
focus on individuals having a personal and continuing interest in the agency, as in a membership
drive, or else be based upon a "value received" philosophy in which a donor receives something of
tangible value, as in a raffle or bake-sale. Samples or descriptions of any printed materials are to be
submitted to the United Way prior to their distribution. No limits are placed on funds from public
grants or fees for service. United Way of Greater New Haven, supra note 9 (fundraising section).
54. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Market divisions have been prohibited even
when ancillary to a joint venture. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596
(1972); United States v. Scaly, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
Courts strike down horizontal market divisions on the view that they suppress competition without
enhancing efficiency. In some respects, market divisions impede competition even more than price-
fixing: by reducing competition, a division of markets insulates each firm from competition not only
with respect to price but also with respect to service, quality, and innovation. See L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 21, at 224-25.
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fundraising drives, which would dissipate the advertising efficiency of a
united charity. It is socially undesirable for charities to spend money on
fundraising in competition with other charities whose services are close
substitutes.55 The part of a donor's gift spent on additional fundraising
only benefits the donor if the additional funds raised have a greater value
to him than the amount of services that could have been produced instead.
A donor that finds the services of many charities of equal value would
benefit if those charities avoided fundraising competition and increased the
output of their services.
The point is identical in form to criticisms of some advertising in the
for-profit sector.5" And yet, under the Sherman Act the potential for so-
cially wasteful competition has never justified agreements among for-profit
producers to suppress competition. 57 Courts have rigidly insisted on pre-
serving competition in order to allow market forces to work.
But there is a difference between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors,
however, that suggests that market divisions among charities (in the form
of fundraising restrictions) should be excused even though they are pro-
hibited among for-profit firms. Donors know considerably less about char-
itable services than consumers know about the products they purchase. In
the for-profit sector, consumers obtain much of their information about
products through experience using them. Such information reduces the
importance of advertising. Donors, on the other hand, rarely have any
firsthand experience with the services of the charity they support. Donors
must therefore obtain virtually all of their information through advertising
by the charity. Yet, dissemination of information sufficient for donors to
make fully informed decisions concerning donations would be unduly
expensive.58
55. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 326; S. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 31 (demonstrating
how an unregulated charity market will impose extremely high fundraising costs on charities).
56. See R. SCHMALENSEE, THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING 6-7 (1972) (competition among pro-
ducers of highly substitutable products is wasteful competition for market share).
57. In National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-96 (1978), the
Court rejected the argument that the particular characteristics of an industry might make competition
undesirable and therefore make anticompetitive practices legal. Defendants claimed that unrestrained
competitive bidding would cause engineers to cut costs in the area of safety, which would be against
the public interest. The Court held that such a determination was for Congress to make, not the
courts: "The Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition
itself is unreasonable." Id. at 696.
Courts have also consistently rejected attempts to justify the activity of cartels on the grounds that
the prices they fix, the quotas they set, and the market divisions to which they agree are reasonable
under the particular circumstances. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951) (market division); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (price-fixing).
The courts' position is based in part upon a realization of the limits of judicial competence. For the
courts to make such assessments would require them to "set sail upon a sea of doubt." United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898) (striking down price-fixing and market
division scheme), modified and afi'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
58. See S. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 31 (suggesting that unregulated charity market may cause
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It may therefore be desirable to reduce competitive advertising among
charities and find other mechanisms to promote cost efficiency in the pro-
duction of charitable services. The monitoring services of united charities
serve this function by reducing the importance of well-informed donors.
Moreover, allowing a united charity some selectivity in its membership
reduces the need for wide dissemination of information: membership deci-
sions can be made by a few well-informed people. A properly functioning
united charity can, therefore, encourage efficient production of charitable
services and avoid wasteful advertising competition.
The undesirable effects of reduced competition can be minimized if a
united charity allows donors who feel adequately informed to allocate
their donation to the charity of their choice. A united charity can en-
courage such donor choice by informing the public about the services per-
formed by its members. B efore concluding that a restriction on fundraising
does not violate the Sherman Act, a court should determine that such in-
formation is being fairly and accurately disseminated.
3. Restrictions on Allocations by Donors
Many united charities effectively prevent an individual donor's prefer-
ences from affecting the relative level of support received by individual
members. Donations typically go into a common fund and are divided by
an allocations committee, often in advance of collection. Some united char-
ities allow donors to designate the recipient of their particular gift, but
such united charities usually take the designated gifts received by an
agency into account when allocating the undesignated gifts. Thus, the des-
ignation by the donor typically has no effect on the amount of money that
a member charity receives relative to other member charities.
Such allocation procedures are in many ways similar to "tie-in" sales.
In the for-profit sector, this term refers to a sale in which a seller will sell
his product to a buyer only in conjunction with a second product. 9 When
a donor gives to a united charity, his gift automatically supports all ser-
vices produced by member agencies in the proportions determined by the
allocations committee. In effect, allocation restrictions "tie" a donor's sup-
port of any united charity member to the support of all other members.60
charities to spend almost their entire budget on fundraising).
59. A common example is the case of a computer manufacturer that requires purchasers to buy its
computer cards. The seller of the computer thus "ties" the sale of the "tying" product, the computer,
to the buyer's purchase of the "tied" product, the computer cards. International Business Machines
Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
60. For a tie-in sale to be effective, the seller must possess market power in the tying product.
Otherwise, consumers will obtain the good from other producers. For a seller to have market power,
demand for the good must be inelastic over some range of price. When demand is inelastic, a small
relative change in price results in an even smaller relative decrease in quantity demanded. Thus, a
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In the for-profit sector, the appropriate law governing tie-in arrange-
ments is in dispute. Many courts have suggested that the sole purpose and
effect of these arrangements is to extend the seller's monopoly power in
one market into another market. Hence, courts have frequently held these
arrangements illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.6' But
many scholars defend tie-in arrangements on the grounds that they gener-
ate efficiencies without enabling a monopolist to increase his monopoly
profits.62 Such scholars argue that a monopolist cannot extract from con-
sumers any more value than his position in the monopolized product al-
lows. It makes no difference whether he extracts his monopoly price by
selling the product alone, or with another less desirable product. If he ties
the sale of two products together, he must presumably reduce the price of
the desirable product to reflect the undesirability of purchasing the second
product.
The courts' view may be more persuasive when applied to tie-in sales
by nonprofit producers. The defense of tie-in arrangements assumes that a
for-profit seller can choose between tying the sale of one product to the
sale of another, and selling the more desirable product alone at a monop-
oly price. A nonprofit monopolist does not exploit his position by explic-
itly raising his price. He can only exploit his position by promoting his
interest at the expense of donors.63 He may, for example, tie the support
of one charitable service to the support of other services that donors prefer
less.64 A united charity that is prohibited from tying charitable services
price increase will increase total expenditure on the good even though fewer goods are produced.
In the nonprofit sector, the same effect may occur if demand for charitable services is inelastic. By
producing services of less value to donors (that is, raising the "price"), charities may lead donors to
spend more on charity even though the output of the desired services declines, as does donor utility.
For a mathematical demonstration of this effect, see Fisher, On Donor Sovereignty and United Chari-
ties, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 632 (1977).
61. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Section 3 of the Clayton Act has also been used to attack tying
arrangements, but it is not important for united charities because it applies only to transactions in-
volving "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities." 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1976). Because the present analysis involves the sale of services, only § 1 of the Sherman Act is
considered, although any distinction between the standards under these two statutes appears now to
have almost vanished. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, 432-41. But see Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605-10 (1953) (drawing distinction between Sherman Act and
Clayton Act standards). At present, a tie-in arrangement violates the Sherman Act when it affects a
substantial amount of commerce and when the tying product is significantly differentiated in the view
of consumers. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 440.
62. See R. BORK, supra note 21, at 365-81; Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Markovits, Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws,
80 YALE L.J. 195 (1970); Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SUP.
CT. REV. 152. But see C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 157-59 (1959); Burstein, A
Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 NW. U.L. REV. 62 (1960); Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and
Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 552 (1965).
63. See supra p. 1601.
64. See Fisher, supra note 60. There are other ways for nonprofit monopolists to exploit their
position, but existing safeguards already pretermit many of them. A nonprofit monopolist could, for
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together will therefore be more responsive to donor desires.
The restriction on allocation by donors may, however, be necessary for
a united charity to capture the full benefits of joint fundraising. Donor
allocation gives each united charity member an incentive to advertise for
itself to convince donors to designate it as the recipient of their donations.
If each member believes others will follow this strategy, all will engage in
outside advertising and the economy of joint advertising will be lost.65
Another way of preserving this efficiency, however, is to prohibit mem-
bers from advertising on their own. 6 Such a prohibition has its own
drawbacks, but many united charities already have such a policy. It is
difficult to determine which policy-restrictions on advertising by mem-
bers, or restrictions on the allocation of funds by donors-is the more de-
sirable means of preserving the benefits of united charities. It does seem,
however, that both policies respond to the same problem, and that each
would be a sufficient response. Thus, under the Sherman Act there is no
justification for a united charity to follow both policies.
This analysis is not meant to imply that the role of the united charity in
the allocations process should be eliminated entirely. The point is simply
that a united charity may not both prevent a donor from allocating his gift
to a particular agency and make it difficult for him to give to the agency
directly by preventing the agency from soliciting him. Both practices are
not "reasonably necessary" to preserve a united charity's efficiency. 7 If a
united charity decides to limit outside solicitations by its members, it must
allow donors to allocate their donations when making gifts through the
united charity. Of course, those donors who wish to delegate the responsi-
bility for allocating their funds need not earmark their donations.6,
4. Boycotts and Concerted Refusals to Deal
Some united charities refuse to solicit in workplaces where other chari-
ties are also allowed to solicit.69 An employer therefore may limit access to
example, exploit his position by unreasonably increasing the salaries of the charity's employees, but
the monitoring procedures of united charities constrain such behavior.
65. See supra pp. 1605-07 (discussing justifications for fundraising restrictions).
66. Id.
67. See supra pp. 1601-02 (describing standards of legality under the rule of reason).
68. United charities should design their allocation procedures to serve both the interests of donors
who want to allocate funds themselves and those who do not. For example, they might establish a
special pool of funds for donors who do not want to allocate funds themselves, which the allocations
committee could allocate without regard to the amount of designated funds received. Another possibil-
ity would be to distribute undesignated funds to each agency in proportion to the designated funds
received by each.
69. See California State Combined Health Agencies Drive, Inc. v. United Way, No. 382,156
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 16, 1977) (several employers terminated relationship with plaintiff after
local United Way allegedly announced it would no longer solicit in workplaces where other cam-
paigns were held).
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his workplace to one united charity even though he would otherwise allow
several independent or united charities to solicit.7 0 This exclusivity pro-
duces inefficiencies in the production of charitable services. First, it in-
creases the relative overhead costs of excluded charities that are denied
access to the payroll deduction system. Second, it imposes search costs on
donors who are not satisfied with the options provided by the united char-
ity allowed to solicit in their workplace.
A united charity's demand for exclusive solicitation rights may be
termed a concerted refusal to deal or a group boycott. The Supreme Court
has, on occasion, implied that group boycotts are illegal per se, 7 1 but in
practice their treatment has varied according to circumstances. 2 "Naked"
boycotts, which aim to drive competitors out of business merely to sup-
press competition, have been held illegal per se.73 Boycotts used to enforce
rules or practices upon the members of a group who break legitimate
group norms have sometimes been found reasonable. 4
If a united charity demands exclusive access to an employer's work-
place, its goal must be to deny competitors the advantages of payroll de-
ductions. An insistence on exclusive access suppresses competition without
producing any socially desirable results. Such conduct therefore constitutes
a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 5
70. He would do so if he believes that the benefit to his firm is greater with only one united
charity soliciting than with any other set of united or independent charities. See id.
71. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broad-
way-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
72. The legality of group boycotts under § 1 of the Sherman Act depends primarily on the pur-
pose of the concerted activity. A boycott clearly harms competitors; its legality depends on whether it
serves a legitimate purpose, see Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925)
(court upholding boycott designed to prevent buyers from placing fraudulent orders); Molinas
v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (upholding disciplinary action
against basketball player suspended for betting on his team), or is an illegitimate attempt to suppress
competition, see Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914)
(holding illegal attempt to induce retailers to refuse to deal with wholesalers who sold directly to
customers); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), alf'd, 317
U.S. 519 (1943). In American Medical Ass'n, the medical society warned hospitals that they might
lose its approval if they opened their facilities to two former members. The court found the boycott
illegal because it was not persuaded that the purpose of the members' expulsion was ethical rather
than economic.
73. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Re-
tail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
74. See supra note 72. A common context in which boycotts are found to be legal is that of self-
regulated athletics. See Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Association of America, 358 F.2d 165, 170
(9th Cir. 1966) (upholding right of Professional Golfers' Association of America to restrict eligibility
in PGA sponsored tournaments), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 1032 (1967); Molinas v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (upholding disciplinary suspension of basketball player for
betting on his team).
75. This conclusion does not imply that a united charity may not refuse to conduct campaigns in
certain workplaces. A united charity has the right to avoid campaigns that are not "profitable." But a
uniform policy that ignores the economic success of individual campaigns is dubious, and if its motiva-
tion is merely to make an already successful campaign even more successful by restricting donor
choice, the illegality is clear.
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A more complicated issue is presented by united charities that do not
demand exclusive access but do create strong incentives for employers to
give them exclusive access. United charities typically provide public recog-
nition for employers whose workers give particularly generously in the
united charity campaign. Such awards can have significant public rela-
tions value for a firm. When an employer allows access to numerous
united charities, the chances of his firm's making a good showing in any
of the campaigns decline because employees will divide their generosity
among the different charities. The employer is thus better off, from the
perspective of public relations, if he limits access to a single united char-
ity.76 It is likely, moreover, that he will choose a large united charity be-
cause of the increased media coverage that it can attract.
A united charity should not be able to take advantage of the combined
public significance of its members to create incentives for employers to
deny access to smaller charities. On the other hand, the willingness of
employers to give charities access to their workplaces at all is, in part, the
result of the public relations value the employers gain. It would be a mis-
take to eliminate this benefit to employers, because it makes possible an
extremely efficient form of generating goodwill. What the Sherman Act
should prohibit are public relations schemes that unnecessarily create in-
centives for employers to limit access to their payroll deductions. Public
relations schemes could be designed to create incentives for employers to
provide more open access. Instead of giving awards based upon employee
donations to a particular united charity, awards could be given based
upon employees' total donations to all charities combined.
Conclusion
This analysis suggests that the benefits of united charities relate pri-
marily to economic efficiency. Through their access to payroll deductions,
united charities reduce the fundraising costs of their members; their moni-
toring procedures reduce the total cost of overseeing the use of gifts. Some
united charity practices, however, restrict donor choices and therefore dis-
advantage those donors who wish to make their own allocative decisions.
The Sherman Act is a suitable tool for regulating united charities; it
permits them to reduce fundraising costs while at the same time it pre-
vents unreasonable restrictions on donor choice. United charities should
operate as efficient fundraising conduits, enhancing donor choice rather
than restricting it. The Sherman Act enables united charities to promote
76. The desire of employers to make a good showing in their annual campaign has on occasion
led employers to pressure employees to contribute. See, e.g., C. BAKAL, supra note 5, at 409-11
(describing pressure tactics); N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1981, § 1, at 40, col. 6 (dismissal of bank em-
ployee for refusing to donate).
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economic efficiency while at the same time it minimizes their interference
with the autonomy of individual donors.
Appendix: The Economic Significance of Free Entry into the Charity
Market
One of the conditions required for an unregulated market to achieve
Pareto optimality is that firms price their output at marginal cost.' Profit-
maximizing firms do not produce at levels for which the marginal cost of
production exceeds the price received for the good (a quantity to the right
of %, in Figure 1, where price equals P1). A nonprofit firm, however,
may produce at any level of output for which it can cover all costs, that is,
any level at which donations cover the average cost of production' (quan-







At any level of output greater than Q*, however, new firms can enter
1. At this level of output, the sale price covers the cost of factor inputs for the last unit of ouput,
but at a higher level of production, the price would not continue to do so. When marginal cost exceeds
price, consumers would benefit if the factor inputs used to produce the last unit were instead used to
produce an alternate good, the price of which covers its full cost of production.
2. Given the heterogeneity of nonprofit organizations, different nonprofits may pursue a variety of
organizational goals (that is, output maximization, budget maximization, quality maximization).
Their goals presumably reflect some combination of the interests of the organization's management
and benefactors. See Newhouse, Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a
Hospital, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 64 (1970) (postulating that nonprofit hospitals have two goals: max-
imization of output and maximization of quality); S. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 31, at 5 (postulating
that united charities seek to maximize their budget net of fundraising costs).
3. The "price" of a charitable service is the amount of a donation required to generate an addi-
tional unit of services. A charity that is willing to produce more additional services with the same
donation has a lower price for its services.
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the market and offer charitable services at a lower price. Free entry will
therefore pressure nonprofit firms to produce at the point of minimum
average cost (Q*, at a price of P2). This level of output equates average
cost with marginal cost. Thus, free entry causes nonprofit firms to produce
at marginal cost despite their lack of profit motive. If other competitive
requirements hold, competition in the charity sector will result in an effi-
cient allocation of resources. 4
4. See Scherer, supra note 26 (discussing conditions for general equilibrium efficiency).
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